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Assuming labor supply along the participation (or extensive) margin implies that a larger transfer
toward low-paid workers than inactive people, i.e., an Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), may
become part of an optimal tax system (Diamond, 1980; Saez, 2002; Brewer et al., 2008; Choné
and Laroque, 2009). This well-known result is obtained under Utilitarian social preferences while
agents diﬀer in terms of skills as well as preferences. However, it is commonly admitted that
preference heterogeneity poses ethical questions that challenge standard objective functions like
Utilitarianism; see, e.g., Rawls (1971), Sen (1980) and Dworkin (1981). Other normative criteria
derived from precise axioms of fairness have been proposed in the social choice literature. However,
they are scarcely used to derive optimal tax policies.1 The optimal income tax literature itself
considers alternative social preferences but always with labor supply along the intensive margin.
For instance, Boadway et al. (2002) use a Utilitarian social welfare function where diﬀerent weights
can be assigned to individuals with diﬀerent preferences for leisure. This amounts to using diﬀerent
cardinalizations of individual utility functions. Paternalistic criteria, in which the planner uses a
reference value for the taste for work and maximizes the sum of these adjusted utilities, have also
been considered; e.g., by Schokkaert et al. (2004). Assuming high- and low-skilled agents with
heterogeneous tastes for labor and labor supply along the participation margin, the present paper
compares the optimal tax policies under a large set of social preferences from the social choice and
the optimal taxation literature.
The ﬁrst contribution of this paper is to show that the social-choice-inspired criteria provide
an additional argument for an optimal tax systema w a yf r o mt h eE I T C .As m a l l e rt r a n s f e rt o w a r d
low-paid workers than inactive people, i.e., a Negative Income Tax (NIT), is more likely to become
optimal. Moreover, under the assumption that the low-skilled have at least as large a participation
elasticity as the high-skilled agents, the labor supply distortion for the high-skilled is tempered.
The second contribution of this paper is to check the optimal tax policies against the equality
of opportunity requirements. In the dominant branch of the equality of opportunity literature,
liberal egalitarian theories of justice, it is argued that income or welfare inequalities arising from
nonresponsibility factors such as innate skills should be eliminated (the compensation principle)
and inequalities arising from responsibility factors such as preferences should be respected (the
responsibility principle).2 We follow the applied literature on equality of opportunity assuming
that agents are responsible for their preferences but not for their skills.3 This paper then checks
the optimal tax schedules that we obtain using the criteria from social choice and also those from
the optimal income tax literature against the compensation and responsibility principles. The
criteria that originate from the social choice approach to equality of opportunity perform much
better than the traditional criteria, under both full and asymmetric information. Given that social
choice criteria were designed to meet one of the principles in the ﬁrst best, this should not come as
a surprise. Under asymmetric information, we also consider an alternative strategy that restricts
1Exceptions are Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2006) and (2007) and Luttens and Ooghe (2007). However, these
papers model labor supply along the intensive margin, rather than along the extensive margin.
2For an overview of this literature, see Fleurbaey (2008) or Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2009). The (in)compatibility
of these two principles was ﬁrst analyzed by Fleurbaey (1995a) and Bossert (1995).
3This assumption is useful in order to analyze the basic structure of solutions in a simple way, and many of the
qualitative results obtained with it carry over to the more complex settings where agents are held responsible for
part of their preferences or of their skills (see Fleurbaey, 2008).
1the search for an optimal tax policy satisfying one of the equality of opportunity principles.
The third contribution is to propose ﬁve new normative criteria that satisfy priority to the
worst-oﬀ (and thus weak) versions of the compensation and responsibility principles. They rely on
a cardinal or alternatively an ordinal measure of welfare. We show that these criteria, just like the
social-choice-inspired criteria, push the optimal tax away from an earned income tax credit and
temper the labor supply distortion of the high-skilled.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the model, provide the character-
ization of the individuals’ behavior, and describe the decision variables of the government under
full and asymmetric information. Section 3 states the axioms behind equality of opportunity and
presents the distinct objective functions. Section 4 investigates the optimal tax policies under full
information, and Section 5 under asymmetric information. Suﬃcient conditions for an NIT or an
EITC are given. Section 6 concludes. The main proofs are presented in the appendix, while some
supplementary material is available in Jacquet and Van de gaer (2010).
2 The model
2.1 Individual behavior
Assume that agents decide whether to work or not.4 They diﬀer along two dimensions: their skill
and their disutility of work. Skills take two values, wH >w L > 0, which correspond to the gross
wages in two types of jobs (low- and high-skilled). The disutility of work, α, is distributed according
to the cumulative distribution function F(α):R+ → [0,1] : α → F (α) and the corresponding
density function f(α). The latter is continuous and positive over its domain.5 These functions are
common knowledge. The proportion of low-skilled agents (or wL-type) in the population is given
by γ, while 1−γ is the proportion of high-skilled people (or wH- t y p e ) .W ea s s u m et h a tp r o d u c t i v i t y
and labor disutility are independently distributed. Utility is quasilinear and represented by:
v(x) − α if they work,
v(x) if they do not work,
where x is consumption, v(x):R+ → R : x → v(x) with v0 > 0 ≥ v00 and limx→∞ v0(x)=0 .
2.2 The government’s decisions
Under full information (so-called ﬁrst best), the government implements a tax policy depending on
α and wY (Y = L,H); hence, it also assigns individuals to low-skilled jobs (where the gross wage is
wL), to high-skilled jobs (where the gross wage is wH) or to inactivity (activity u). Activity assign-
ment is captured through the functions δL (α):R+ → {0,1} : δL (α)=1(δL (α)=0 )i fwL-agents
with this value for α are employed (inactive) and δH (α):R+ → {0,1} : δH (α)=1(δH (α)=0 )i f
wH-agents with this value for α are employed (inactive). Low-skilled agents cannot get access to
high-skilled jobs, and because eﬃciency matters, it will never be optimal that high-skilled agents
4There is growing evidence that the extensive margin matters a lot; e.g., Meghir and Phillips (2008).
5We want to see whether an EITC or an NIT is optimal. This requires us to describe the participation tax rates
only. Therefore, it is appropriate to assume a discrete support for skills, such as in Saez (2002). For simplicity, we
assume two skill levels, but increasing the number of skills does not modify our main results. Continuity of α is
assumed for simplicity.
2work in low-skilled jobs. By putting these people in high-skilled jobs instead of low-skilled jobs,
they produce more, which can be used to increase someone’s consumption. Hence, formally, the
government determines four consumption functions: xw
L (α) for the wL-workers, xw
H (α) for the
wH-workers, xu
L (α) for the wL-inactive agents and xu
H (α) for the wH-inactive agents. All these
functions go from R+ to R+.
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where R is an exogenous revenue requirement, which can be positive or negative. This budget
constraint must be binding at the optimum as all government objectives considered in this paper
are increasing in individuals’ consumption.





L(α) together with δL (α) and δH (α), which are normatively desirable and satisfy the
government budget constraint (1).
In the second best, the tax schedule can depend only on income levels (0,w L or wH). The
government then deﬁnes three consumption levels xu,x L and xH, denoting consumption when
not participating in the labor force, and when working in low-skilled and in high-skilled jobs,
respectively. These consumption levels have to meet the government budget constraint and the set
of self-selection or incentive compatibility constraints (which will be stated in Section 5), and have
to be normatively desirable. The next section discusses which normative principles or criteria the
government can use.
3E q u a l i t y o f o p p o r t u n i t y
The next subsection formally deﬁnes equality of opportunity in order to study whether the nor-
mative criteria usually assumed in the optimal tax literature succeed in reaching it.
3.1 Two equality of opportunity principles
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with the individual’s own utility.
We assume throughout that people are responsible for their tastes for work α but not for their
skills6. We can then apply Fleurbaey’s (1994) approach and capture the intuitions of equality of
6We follow here the usual assumption in the applied literature on equality of opportunity. Two further remarks
can be made at this point. First, if people are not responsible for anything, from a perspective of equality of
opportunity, the only possible objectives are full equality of utility levels or leximin. Second, it is possible to follow
the suggestion by Pestieau and Racionero (2009) to decompose the parameter α into two components: α = αP +αD,
w h e r ep e o p l ea r er e s p o n s i b l ef o rαP (a preference parameter) but not for αD (a disability parameter). The present
framework can be adjusted to deal with this issue without altering the main results of this paper.
3opportunity in two axioms. The ﬁrst equality of opportunity axiom expresses the idea of compen-
sation.
EWEP (Equal Welfare for Equal Preferences)
∀α ∈ R+ : u(xL (α),δL (α),α)=u(xH (α),δH (α),α).
An allocation satisfying EWEP is such that diﬀerences in skills do not inﬂuence a person’s
welfare. The second axiom of equality of opportunity expresses the idea of responsibility.
ETES (Equal Transfers for Equal Skills)
∀α,α0 : δL (α)=δL (α0)=1and ∀α00 : δL (α00)=0:
xw
L (α) − wL = xw
L (α0) − wL = xu
L (α00)=xu
L,
∀α,α0 : δH (α)=δH (α0)=1and ∀α00 : δH (α00)=0:
xw
H (α) − wH = xw
H (α0) − wH = xu
H (α00)=xu
H,
with some abuse of notation for the last term in the expressions for both skill levels. The axiom
requires that taxes only depend on skill level. For each skill level, all the inactive get the same
beneﬁt, all workers pay the same tax, and the transfer received by the inactive is equal to minus
the tax paid by the workers. Therefore, welfare diﬀerences that are caused by diﬀerential tastes
are not compensated and are fully respected.
We formally deﬁne full equality of opportunity as follows.
FEO (Full Equality of Opportunity)
An allocation satisﬁes full equality of opportunity if it satisﬁes both EWEP and ETES.
In the traditional framework, where the government only (re)distributes consumption, even in
the ﬁrst best, generically, an FEO allocation does not exist; see, e.g., Fleurbaey (1994) and Bossert
(1995). For this reason, Fleurbaey (1995b) suggests weakening at least one of the axioms while
maintaining the other.7 This allows him to characterize two allocations. First, the Conditional
Equality (CE) allocation keeps ETES but requires EWEP only in the situation where all agents
have the reference value (denoted e α) for their taste parameter. Second, the Egalitarian Equivalent
(EE) allocation keeps EWEP but requires ETES only when all agents have the reference value for
the resource bundle, here taken to be the consumption level e x and δY =1(Y = L or H).
CE (Conditional Equality)
An allocation is the conditional equality allocation if and only if for all α and all Y it equalizes
u(xY (α),δY (α), e α) at the highest feasible level.
EE (Egalitarian Equivalence)
An allocation is egalitarian equivalent if and only if for all α and all Y : u(xY (α),δY (α),α)=
u(e x,1,α) and e x is at the highest feasible level.
The CE allocation ensures that all individuals are equally well oﬀ with their actual bundle of
resources when this is evaluated using the reference preference e α. The EE allocation makes all
individuals indiﬀerent between their actual resource bundle and the reference bundle where they
7Of course, it is also possible to weaken both axioms simultaneously; see, e.g., Bossert and Fleurbaey (1996) or
Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2009).
4work and get a consumption level e x.8 In our deﬁnition here, we incorporate that no resources are
wasted, in the CE allocation, by equalizing at the highest possible level, and in the EE allocation
by pursuing indiﬀerence at the highest feasible level of e x . The CE allocation can lead to Pareto-
dominated allocations because it evaluates bundles with reference preferences.9 By contrast, the
EE allocation always satisﬁes Pareto eﬃciency because it uses individual preferences in order to
compute equivalent resources xY (α) and δY (α); i.e., the resources that would equalize all utility
levels to u(e x,1,α). A CE or EE allocation need not exist. In particular, in the second best, it
will not be possible to equalize the reference utilities as required by CE, and even in the ﬁrst best,
indiﬀerence for all individuals with the reference bundle is not feasible in our model. As is standard
in the social choice literature, we then formulate maximin social orderings inspired by the CE and
EE allocation at the end of the next subsection.
3.2 Diﬀerent social objective functions
This paper will consider the following social objective functions extensively used in the optimal
taxation literature.
The Utilitarian social objective function (used in, e.g., Ebert (1992), Diamond and Sheshinski





L (α)) − α]dF(α)+γ
Z ∞
0






H (α)) − α]dF(α)+( 1− γ)
Z ∞
0
(1 − δH (α))v(xu
H (α))dF(α). (2)
Our Welfarist social objective is the average of a concave transformation of individual utilities.
The concave transformation allows the expression of inequality aversion with respect to the distri-
bution of utilities. Let the function Ψ : R → R : a → Ψ(a) be a strictly concave function. Our



















Assumed in the seminal article of Mirrlees (1971), this welfare function has been very popular since
then (e.g., Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980), Diamond (1998), Choné and Laroque (2005), Kaplow
(2008), Kleven et al. (2009)).
The objective function used by Boadway et al. (2002) allows us to attach a weight to individuals’
utilities that depends on their taste for leisure. Let W(α):R+ → R+ : α → W (α) be the social
welfare weight given to the utility of an individual with disutility of work equal to α. The Boadway
8This is similar to the “full-health equivalent income” proposed by Fleurbaey (2005). An alternative egalitarian
equivalent allocation could make all individuals indiﬀerent between their actual resource bundle and the reference
bundle where they are inactive and get the reference level of consumption.
9The idea behind the CE allocation can be preserved if one wants to avoid a clash with Pareto eﬃciency. A way
to do this is to rely on the laissez-faire equivalent budget sets (which reﬂect the agent’s actual preferences) and to
apply the reference preference to those; see Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2005, 2007) for more details.
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(1 − δH (α))W (α)v(xu
H (α))dF(α). (4)
This objective function was explicitly introduced to deal with individuals who are heterogeneous
in skills and preferences. Also used in Cremer et al. (2004 and 2007), for instance, this criterion
adopts distinct cardinalizations of individual utilities depending on the individual’s taste parameter
α. An alternative objective function in the vein of Boadway et al. (2002) can be considered by
assuming that the weight function W (.) applies only to the disutility of work part of each agent’s
utility function rather than the part that also involves consumption.10
Our next social objective function uses a paternalistic view for the valuation of labor disutility.
We deﬁne the reference labor disutility as α ≥ 0, which is the weight attached by the government
















H (α)) − α]dF(α)+( 1− γ)
Z ∞
0
(1 − δH (α))v(xu
H (α))dF(α).(5)
With this objective function, the social planner has a diﬀerent idea from the individuals themselves
about the ‘correct’ or reasonable disutility of work. There is then a clear paternalistic motive for
taxation that arises from diﬀerences between social and private preferences. Schokkaert et al.
(2004) consider this social objective function, but alternative paternalistic Utilitarian objectives
are possible. For instance, it might be argued that the planner only does not respect disutilities of




.11 Marchand et al. (2003) and
Pestieau and Racionero (2009) consider another alternative paternalistic approach in which the
government attaches a larger weight to the labor disutility of disabled individuals. Maximization
of Non-Welfarist social objective functions typically selects allocations that are not Pareto eﬃcient.
To state the next two objective functions, which are less standard, we deﬁne an operator that
takes the ﬁr s te l e m e n to fas e tw i t ht w oe l e m e n t si fδ (α) equals one, and the second element
otherwise. Formally, we deﬁne the operator as:
oper
δ(α)
{a,b} = a if δ (α)=1and oper
δ(α)
{a,b} = b if δ (α)=0 .
Roemer (1993 and 1998) proposes that equality of opportunity for welfare holds when the
utilities of all those who exercised a comparable degree of responsibility are equal, irrespective
of their skills. Assuming that those who have the same preferences have exercised a comparable
degree of responsibility, the ideal is to give the same utility to those with the same preferences,
10It can then easily be checked that the full information allocation is qualitatively identical to the Utilitarian one.
For brevity’s sake, we limit our discussion of the second-best solution for this criterion to Appendix C.
11We are grateful to one of the referees for pointing out this possibility. For brevity’s sake, we limit our discussion
of the second-best solution for this criterion to Appendix C.
6irrespective of their skills. Because utilities have to be equal for each preference, it will usually
(except, as we will see, in the ﬁrst best) not be possible to achieve this. Roemer therefore suggests
to maximize a weighted average of the minimal utilities across individuals having the same tastes.
As a result, Fleurbaey (2008) calls this the mean of mins criterion. Roemer’s (1998) objective

















For each α, the government assigns low- and high-skilled individuals to employment or inactivity.
The min function in the integral term takes, for each α level, the smallest utility across skill types.
T h eR o e m e rr u l em a x i m i z e st h es u m( o v e rα) of these minimal utility levels. It has been used by
Roemer et al. (2003) to compare empirically the extent to which ﬁscal policies manage to equalize
opportunities for income acquisition in a set of countries.
While Roemer’s proposal is well known, an obvious alternative was proposed by Van de gaer
(1993). The starting point is that for each level of skill, utility as a function of the taste parameter
can be interpreted as the utilities to which someone with that skill level has access. The proposal is
then to maximize the value of the smallest opportunity set, where the opportunity set is the surface
under utilities to which she has access, weighted by the frequency with which the corresponding
preference parameter occurs. Hence, the proposed social objective function, labeled the min of
means criterion by Fleurbaey (2008), is:

















This criterion and Roemer’s criterion were used to compute optimal linear income taxes in Bossert
et al. (1999) and Schokkaert et al. (2004). Axiomatic characterizations of these criteria can be
found in Ooghe et al. (2007) and Fleurbaey (2008).
We formulate the maximin objective function inspired by the CE allocation:
SCE =m i n
α,wY
u(xY (α),δY (α), e α), (8)
meaning that the optimal policy is determined such that the lowest level of utility that someone in
the population gets with her actual allocation, evaluated at the reference preferences e α,i sa sh i g h
as possible. The criterion was explicitly considered by Bossert et al. (1999).
Finally, we formulate a maximin objective function inspired by the EE allocation. For each
individual, we determine the consumption level that she needs when she has to work and is such
that she is indiﬀerent to this bundle and her actual consumption bundle. Evidently, for workers,
this is simply their actual consumption level. Inactive people require a consumption level equal to
v−1 (v(xu
Y (α)) + α),w h e r exu
Y (α) is their actual consumption level. Hence, we can deﬁne an EE
ordering as maximizing:






L (α)) + α),v−1 (v(xu
H (α)) + α)
ª
. (9)
7In our framework, this social ordering is the natural counterpart of an ordering proposed by Fleur-
baey and Maniquet (2005 and 2006). In their papers, the equivalent wage for an individual is
deﬁned as the wage rate such that she is indiﬀerent between her actual bundle and the bundle
that she could reach if she had her equivalent wage. Their proposed social ordering is then to
maximize the minimal equivalent wage. Fleurbaey and Maniquet use an intensive labor supply
choice model; the computation of the equivalent wage involves a counterfactual labor supply choice
lying between inactivity and full-time employment. In our extensive labor supply model, such a
choice is not available. However, we can adjust the concept by comparing the actual consumption
bundle with the wage making the individual indiﬀerent between that bundle and full-time employ-
ment. Formally, in our extensive margin model, the equivalent wage is deﬁned for the employed
as xwE
Y (α)=xw




− α = v(xu
Y (α)), which implies
that xuE (α)=v−1 (v(xu
Y (α)) + α). Maximinning this equivalent wage leads to the social ordering
deﬁned in (9).
4 First best
This section studies the ﬁrst-best optimal policies under the various criteria. The details of the
analytical derivations are given in the supplementary material. The optimal activity assignment,
denoted A, can vary with the agent’s skill level, denoted Y , and with her disutility of work α.
Similarly, her optimal consumption can vary with α and Y , but it can also be activity (A)s p e c i ﬁc.
Whether and how these factors inﬂuence the optimal policy depends on the government’s objective
function. The following table summarizes the results.
Table 1: Determinants of optimal policies in the ﬁrst best.
Social Objective Determinants of Activity Determinants of Consumption
Utilitarian α,Y −
Welfarist α,Y α,A
Boadway et al. α,Y α
Paternalistic Ut. Y −
Roemer α,Y α,Y,A
Van de gaer α,Y Y
FEO −−
Egalitarian Equivalent α A
Conditional Egalitarian YA
Note: the entries in the table give the determinants of the optimal policy decision: α indicates the
disutility of work, Y the skill level (high or low skill) and A that the optimal consumption varies with
activity (employed or inactive). Entry “-” means that the optimal policy is independent of α,Y and A.
Let X = U, W, B, P, R, V , CE or EE denote the Utilitarian, Welfarist, Boadway et al.,
Paternalistic Utilitarian, Roemer, Van de gaer, Conditional Equality and Egalitarian Equivalent
objectives, respectively. As far as activity assignment is concerned, there are four families of
optimal policies. In the ﬁrst family, which occurs for X = U, W, B, R and V , the individual’s
activity is determined by her disutility of work α and her skill level Y ,a sd i s p l a y e db y“ α,Y”i n
Table 1. The planner determines threshold levels of work’s disutility α∗
L and α∗
H such that agents
with skill level Y and α ≤ αX∗
Y work while those with α > αX∗
Y do not.12 Because of the higher
12Under the Boadway et al. criterion with an elasticity smaller than −1 (which requires that W (α) be suﬃciently
8productivity of the high-skilled, αX∗
H ≥ αX∗
L . The second family, which occurs for X = P or CE,
determines who has to work according to the skill level Y only (as denoted by “Y ” in Table 1). For
each skill level, the planner is indiﬀerent whether work is done by those with a high or low disutility
of work. This arises because of the nature of these paternalistic criteria, which assign the same
disutility of work to everyone. Moreover, because of the higher productivity of the high-skilled,
again more high-skilled than low-skilled work. The third family of activity assignment rule occurs
for EE. When calculating the equivalent wages of the inactive, individual preferences α matter,
as can be seen from the last two terms in (9). The disutility of work increases the equivalent wage
of the inactive, and its eﬀect is the same for high- and low-skilled such that activity is α-speciﬁc,
under EE. This is denoted by the entry “α” in Table 1. Under EE, we then obtain a special case
of the ﬁrst family with αEE∗
L = αEE∗
H . Finally, the fourth family occurs for the FEO objective
function. As shown in the supplemental material, either everyone works or everyone is inactive
under FEO. Activity assignment is then independent of both skill and disutility of work, which is
denoted by the entry “-” in Table 1.
Three of the four families we just described (“Y ”, “α” and “-”) are also valid for consumption
assignments, but two additional families can occur (“A”a n d“ α,A”). First, for X = U, P and
FEO, everybody receives the same consumption level; hence, consumption is independent of indi-
vidual characteristics. This is denoted by the entry “-” in Table 1. The U and P planners equalize




(X = U or P) and hence consumption levels.
Similarly, the Boadway et al. planner aims to equalize the social marginal utilities of consumption.
Because his social marginal utilities of consumption xx
Y equal W (α)v0 (xx
Y ) (with x = w or u),
Boadway et al.’s consumption is increasing (decreasing) in α if the weight W (α) is increasing
(decreasing) in α. This second family is then denoted by the entry “α” in Table 1. The Welfarist





Y (α)) for workers of skill Y (Y = L,H). Therefore, all inactive
receive the same consumption level while the consumption of workers is increasing in α.F u r t h e r -
more, workers with the same α receive the same consumption, whatever their skills. Because we
know that agents with α ∈ (α∗R
L ,α∗R
H ] are assigned to work (are inactive) if they have high (low)
skill, skills do not (directly) drive consumption diﬀerences, but activities do. This explains the
entry “α,A” in Table 1 under Welfarism. In the fourth family, which occurs for the Van de gaer
criterion, consumption diﬀerences only take place when skills diﬀer. This corresponds to the entry
“Y ” in Table 1. All high-skilled receive the same consumption, and all low-skilled receive the same
consumption, the former being at least as big as the latter. Fifth, consumption determination
for the Roemer planner can best be explained by the combination of its Utilitarian feature and
a concern with compensation. All workers with α ≤ αR∗
L and all inactive with α > αR∗
H get the
same consumption level. Moreover, wH-workers and wL-inactive having the same α ∈ [α∗R
L ,α∗R
H )
reach an identical utility level, which determines their consumption α, skill and activity-speciﬁc.
Therefore, the entry in Table 1 is “α,Y,A”. Finally, for X = EE and CE, all workers get the same
consumption bundle (irrespective of their skill level and disutility of work), which diﬀers from the
declining in α), the utility levels of agents with larger a are highly discounted compared with those of agents with
lower α. Therefore, the planner assigns those with a high α to work, and those with a low α to inactivity. However,
this can be seen as perverse because this activity assignment goes fully against individuals’ preferences. To avoid
this perverse case, we assume (∂W (α)/∂α)(α/W (α)) > −1 in our discussion.
9consumption bundle oﬀered to the inactive. This is summarized by the entry “A” in Table 1.
We now verify whether the resulting optimal policies satisfy EWEP or ETES. To verify EWEP,
consider ﬁrst the criteria leading to an activity assignment rule of the ﬁrst (α,Y) or the second
(Y ) family. For these criteria (U, W, B, R, V , P and CE), typically more high-skilled than
low-skilled have to work, such that there exist values of α for which high-skilled, contrary to
low-skilled, have to work. By deﬁnition, EWEP then requires v(xu
L (α)) = v(xw
H (α)) − α ⇔
xu
L (α)=v−1 (v(xw
H(α)) − α) ∀α ∈ [α∗X
L ,α∗X
H ), which requires consumption to depend on both
skills and tastes. Hence none of these criteria, except Roemer’s criterion, satisﬁes EWEP. Finally,
both EE and FEO optimal policies satisfy EWEP. Under EE, activity assignment depends only on
disutility of work; hence, there are no values for α for which high-skilled work and low-skilled are
inactive. Therefore, EWEP is guaranteed under EE because consumption levels vary with activity
only. By construction, the FEO allocation satisﬁes EWEP. This is realized by treating everyone
equally in terms of activity assignment and consumption.
ETES requires that for each skill level, the consumption received by the inactive equals the
taxes paid by the employed (see Section 3.1). Hence, if there is a skill level with both inactive and
employed where the inactive receive the same consumption as the employed, ETES is violated.
This occurs for X = U,P,R and V . The Welfarist planner also violates ETES because it gives
diﬀerent consumption bundles to workers depending on their α. The Boadway et al. and EE
planners give the same consumption to high- and low-skilled workers. Therefore, because of their
distinct productivity, the two tax levels that the workers pay cannot be identical, and so these
tax levels cannot both be equalized to the inactive’s consumption. ETES is again violated. Under
CE, the supplemental material emphasizes that whenever for a skill Y there are both inactive and
workers, consumptions are determined such that −xu = wY −xw
Y ; hence, ETES is satisﬁed. In the
FEO allocation, everybody either works or is inactive, such that the ETES requirement becomes
empty and ETES is trivially satisﬁed. We summarize the performance of all criteria from the
equality of opportunity principles in Table 2.
Table 2: Equality of opportunity axioms and social objectives in the ﬁrst best.
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Egalitarian Equivalent Yes No
Conditional Egalitarian No Yes
Given the origin of these social orderings, it is not surprising to see that the criteria that
originate from the social choice approach to equality of opportunity perform much better than the
traditional criteria. As emphasized in Sections 3.1 and 3.2, they were designed to do so.
The next section assumes that the tax schedule cannot depend on individual characteristics
any more, only on income (e.g., because of asymmetric information).
105 Second-best optima
5.1 Second-best constraints and their implications
In the second best, the government needs to take into account the set of incentive compatibility
constraints (hereafter ICC) in order to prevent individuals of a given type from mimicking (i.e.,
taking the tax treatment designed for) individuals of other types. We ﬁrst state these IC constraints
and then discuss their implications for the social objective functions.
Agents of wL- t y p ec h o o s eb e t w e e nv(xu) and v(xL) − α. Introducing the threshold value α∗
L,
and dropping the superscript X for notational simplicity, the ICC13 on wL-agents can be written
as:
v(xL) − α∗
L = v(xu), (10)
such that a low-skilled with taste parameter α chooses low-skilled employment instead of inactivity
if and only if α ≤ α∗
L.
Agents of wH-type choose between v(xu), v(xL) −α and v(xH) − α. Because all our objective
functions are increasing in individuals’ consumption, it will, just like in the ﬁrst best, never be
optimal that high-skilled people work in low-skilled jobs. By putting these people in high-skilled
jobs instead of low-skilled jobs, they produce more, which can be used to increase everyone’s
consumption in a way that respects the ICC and hence increases the social objective’s value.
Consequently, to induce high-skilled people to work in high-skilled jobs:
xH ≥ xL, (11)
and, introducing the threshold value α∗
H, the ICC on agents of wH-type states:
v(xH) − α∗
H = v(xu), (12)
such that a high-skilled agent with taste parameter α prefers high-skilled employment to inactivity
if and only if α ≤ α∗




As a result of the second-best constraints (10), (12) and (13), irrespective of the social objective
function, the optimal activity will vary with skill level and disutility of work. Moreover, because
of (11), for each value of α, the utility of wH-workers is at least as high as that of wL-workers.
Hence, the utilities as a function of α,f o rwL-a n dwH-skilled agents, are presented in Figure 1.
13The set of IC constraints for each agent of type (wY ,α) (with Y = L,H and α ∈ R+) can be rewritten as
constraints (10)—(12). Moreover, because the labor supply decision is restricted to be binary, the (direct truth-
ful) mechanism that implements the optimal allocations is not fully revealing. Each agent fully reveals her wY
information but not her α value; she announces only whether α is larger or smaller than α∗
Y .
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The solid line is the utility of a wH-individual. She works if her disutility of work α ≤ α∗
H,
and she is inactive otherwise. Similarly, the bold dotted line is the utility of a wL-individual. The
latter works for α ≤ α∗
L and is inactive otherwise. Diﬀerent planners choose distinct values for
(xu,x L,x H,α∗
L,α∗
H), but the qualitative shape of the utilities as a function of α, for high- and
low-skilled individuals, is always as indicated in the graph.
The second-best framework has important implications for the equality of opportunity princi-
ples, as stated in the following lemma.
Lemma 1 Equality of opportunity principles in the second best.
(a) A necessary and suﬃcient condition to satisfy EWEP fully is that α∗
L = α∗
H, which requires
that xL = xH.
(b) A necessary and suﬃcient condition to satisfy ETES fully is that xL − wL = xu = xH − wH.
Part (a) (whose proof is given in Appendix A) says that the threshold values α∗
L and α∗
H have to
be the same. To accomplish this, the government has to oﬀer the same consumption level to high-
and low-skilled workers. It implies that the same numbers of high- and low-skilled individuals will
work. Part (b) of the corollary follows immediately from application of the ETES axiom and has
two noteworthy implications. First, because xL − wL = xu and xH − wH = xu,t h eg o v e r n m e n t
cannot subsidize or tax the participation decision. Because it cannot do this at the bottom end
of the skill distribution, there is neither a negative income tax nor an earned income tax credit.
Second, because xL −wL = xH −wH, the government cannot redistribute between low- and high-
skilled workers. This is a very severe restriction, which makes the ETES axiom diﬃcult to defend
in the second-best context.
As a result of the second-best constraints, the second-best optimal tax problem in its general
form reduces to the following maximization problem.





e SX (xL,x H,x u,α∗
L,α∗
H),
12subject to the government budget constraint:
γ [(wL − xL)F (α∗
L) − xu (1 − F (α∗
L))] + (1 − γ)[(wH − xH)F (α∗
H) − xu (1 − F (α∗
H))] − R =0 ,
and constraints (10), (11) and (12).
The second-best framework has important consequences for the speciﬁcation of the social ob-
jective functions. Combining the expressions for the social objective functions (2), (3), (4), (5), (6),
(7), (8), (9) with expressions (10), (11), (12) and (13) results in the following objective functions,
as shown in Appendix A. Again, we omit the superscripts U, W, B, P, R, V , CE and EE for
notational simplicity.
(a) Utilitarian





































(c) Boadway et al.

















































Low e α : e SCE1 = v(xu),
High e α : e SCE2 = v(xL).
(h) Egalitarian Equivalent
e SEE = xL.
13Under asymmetric information, the criteria of Roemer and Van de gaer imply equivalent poli-
cies. Because of the second-best constraint, utility as a function of the taste parameter of the
low-skilled will never be below utility as a function of the taste parameter of the high-skilled. One
implication of this is that the opportunity set for the low-skilled is below that for the high-skilled;
hence, in the second best, the mean of mins and min of means criteria will yield the same solu-
tions. Observe further that for low values of e α, the Conditional Egalitarian planner identiﬁes the
nonemployed as the worst-oﬀ and for high values of e α,i ti d e n t i ﬁes the working low-skilled as the
worst-oﬀ.
5.2 Optimal tax formula
Before we can characterize the optimal tax rates, we need to introduce more deﬁnitions. Let
TL = wL − xL, TH = wH − xH,a n dTu = −xu be the tax paid by the low-skilled workers, the
high-skilled workers and the inactive, respectively. Deﬁne the elasticities of participation of the
low-skilled with respect to xL



















respectively. Next, observe that the average of the inverse of the private marginal utility of con-




















Let the subscripts on the function e S denote the partial derivative of e S with respect to the argument
in the subscript and note that the eﬀect of a uniform increase in private utilities on the social































λ(1 − γ)F (α∗
H)
.
The following theorem states the solution for the general second-best problem.
Theorem 1 Under asymmetric information, the optimal consumption levels have to satisfy the





































































L = v (xL) − v (xu),w eg e t∂α∗
L/∂xL = v0 (xL);
hence, we obtain (14).
14where ν is the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the constraint xH ≥ xL.
A simple heuristic interpretation of the optimal tax formulas, in the spirit of Saez (2002), is
given below, while the formal proof is provided in Appendix B.
Consider a small increase in consumption xL (i.e., a small reduction of the income tax in low-
skilled jobs) around the optimal tax schedule. This has a mechanical eﬀect, a behavioral eﬀect (or
labor supply response) and an eﬀect on the incentive compatibility constraint.
Mechanical eﬀect
There is an mechanical decrease in tax revenue equal to −γF(α∗
L)dxL because low-skilled workers
have dxL additional consumption. Each unit of xL improves the social objective by e SX
xL/λ in




L) − e SX
xL/λ
´












The change dxL > 0 induces a change in α∗
L equal to (∂α∗
L/∂xL)dxL. By (10), ∂α∗
L/∂xL = v0 (xL)




such that the induced change in α∗
L is [F (α∗
L)η(xL,α∗
L)]/[xLf (α∗
L)]dxL. A change in the critical
value α∗
L has an eﬀect on the social objective, equal to e SX
α∗
L/λ in terms of government revenue, and
increases government revenue by γ [TL − Tu]f (α∗















Eﬀect on the Incentive Compatibility Constraint
An increase in xL of one unit tightens the incentive compatibility constraint, which has an eﬀect
on the social objective function equal to −ν,w h i c hi sw o r t h−ν/λ in terms of government revenue.
Hence this ICC eﬀect in terms of government revenue equals:
−(ν/λ)dxL.
At the optimum, the sum of these three eﬀects equals zero. It is easy to verify that this yields the
ﬁrst equation in Theorem 1. The second equation can be given a similar interpretation.
The λ
−1 equations are similar to Diamond and Sheshinski’s (1995) equation (6), p.6, and
are associated with an equal marginal change of the consumption of everyone in the economy.
Consider a uniform increase in all private utilities of one unit. This does not change the activity
decisions. To accomplish this uniform increase, for each wY -worker, we need 1/v0 (xY ) extra
units of consumption (Y = L,H), and for each inactive person, we need 1/v0 (xu) extra units of
consumption. Weighting this by the frequencies of these groups in the population, we ﬁnd that we
need an additional gP (xu,x L,x H,α∗
L,α∗
H) units of public funds to ﬁnance this operation. In terms
of social welfare, this is worth λgP (xu,x L,x H,α∗
L,α∗
H). This has to be equal to the increase in
15the social objective function caused by the uniform increase in utilities, which is equal to D.T h e
equation for λ
−1 thus equates the inverse of the marginal cost of public funds to the ratio between
the average of the inverse of the private utilities and the marginal social utility of a uniform increase
in all individual utilities.
Observe that the optimal tax formulas in Theorem 1 contain three elements: the deviation of
the average social marginal utility of consumption for workers of a particular skill level from unity,
1−gX
Y , the Lagrangian multiplier ν and the term e SX
α∗
Y (Y = L or H). The last two terms have not
been dealt with in the literature on optimal taxation in the case of extensive labor supply, as they
do not appear in the social objective functions U and W that have been considered so far. This is
stated in the following lemmata.
Lemma 2 The value of e SX
α∗
Y (Y = L,H):
(a) e SX
α∗








H − α](1− γ)f (α∗
H).
Lemma 3 The value of the Lagrangian multiplier:
(a) ν =0for X = U, W, B, P and CE1,
(b) ν ≥ 0 for X = R, EE and CE2.
Lemma 2 follows from partially diﬀerentiating the expressions for the social objective functions
with respect to α∗
Y (Y = L,H). These terms represent the direct eﬀects of changes in the critical
values on the social objective functions and occur only in the Paternalist case. Lemma 3 is proved
in Appendix B. To see how it works, suppose that ν > 0, such that xH = xL,a n dt a k ea n
inﬁnitesimal ε > 0. Next, increase xH by an amount dxH = ε/(1 − γ) and decrease xL by
an amount dxL = ε/γ.S u c ha no p e r a t i o nh a sn oe ﬀect on the social objective functions listed in
Lemma 3 (a) but increases government revenue, which can be distributed in an incentive-compatible
way to all agents, increasing the value of the social objective function. Observe that under the
social objective functions listed in Lemma 3 (b), the eﬀect of this operation depends on whether
t h en e g a t i v ed i r e c te ﬀect on the social objective function because of the decrease in xL is oﬀset by
the increase in the social objective thanks to the increase in xL because of the incentive-compatibly
distributed increase in government revenue of the operation.
Lemma 3 combined with Lemma 1 has implications for the performance of the diﬀerent social
objective functions from the perspective of the equality of opportunity principles. The U, W, B,
P and CE1 criteria have a zero value for ν, and their solutions have xH >x L (as shown in the
supplemental material). Therefore, α∗
H > α∗
L, such that EWEP is violated under those criteria.
However, with the R, EE and CE2 criteria, ν may be strictly positive, in which case xH = xL and
α∗
H = α∗
L such that EWEP is satisﬁed.
In order to obtain optimal tax rates with the diﬀerent social objective functions, we use the
relevant properties of these social objective functions and plug them into the equations of Theorem
1. Lemma 2 gives us the values for e SX
α∗
Y (Y = L,H), and Lemma 3 the values for the Lagrangian
multipliers νX. The average social marginal utility of consumption gX
Y under objective functions
X for agents of skill level Y are given in Table 3. Using these expressions in the equations of
Theorem 1, together with νX =0for X = U, W, B, P and CE1, results in Corollary 1.15
15The optimal activity assignments are characterized by α∗
H > α∗
L > 0 under the U, W, B, P and CE1 criteria,
16Table 3: The average social marginal utility of consumption gX
Y for social objective X




























































Corollary 1 Under asymmetric information, the optimal consumption levels have to satisfy the
budget constraint, constraints (10), (11) and (12), and the expressions given in the following table.
































































































































































Taking as a benchmark case the formula for the popular objective functions U and W,t h r e e
features of the optimal tax formula are striking. Let us focus on the formula for the low-skilled.
First, with the Paternalistic Utilitarian criterion, the extra term [α∗
L − α]/[λxL] appears. It cap-
tures the social value of the divergence between private and social preferences. Second, with the
social policies inspired by equality of opportunity principles (X = R, CE2 or EE), it is possible
that the constraint xH ≥ xL is binding and ν > 0; hence, this term enters the optimal tax formula.
If the constraint xH ≥ xL were absent, the planner would like to increase xL,w h i c hr e q u i r e sa







L decreases. The presence of the multiplier makes it clear
while α∗
H ≥ α∗
L under the R, EE and CE2 criteria. Moreover, α∗
H < ∞ for all criteria. The supplemental material
states the proofs.







L must be higher. Third, under CE1,t h e
optimal tax levels have a very simple structure: the (per capita) tax revenue from the low- and
high-skilled workers is maximized, as this maximizes the transfer toward the nonemployed.
Since Diamond (1980), it is well known that subsidizing the low-skilled workers more than
inactive people (i.e., TL <T u) can be optimal when the labor supply is modeled along the extensive
margin. Using the deﬁnition of Saez (2002), an Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) is then optimal.
On the contrary, when TL >T u, a Negative Income Tax (NIT) is optimal. Alternatively, TL <
(>)Tu can be rewritten as wL < (>)xL −xu; i.e., the income gain when a low-skilled agent enters
the labor force (xL − xu) is larger (smaller) than her gross labor income (wL). In other words,
the labor supply of the low-skilled is distorted upwards (downwards), compared with laissez faire.
Theorem 1 can be used to study the necessary conditions for an EITC or an NIT under criteria
other than the standard Utilitarian and Welfarist ones. Corollary 2 emphasizes that the Roemer,
EE, CE and Paternalistic Utilitarian criteria challenge the standard necessary conditions.
Corollary 2 The following table provides necessary and suﬃcient conditions for optimality of the
EITC or NIT in the second best.
Table 5: Optimality of EITC or NIT in the second best.















NIT (EITC) if gX
L − νX
λγF(αX∗
L ) < (>)1
Conditional Egalitarian type 1 NIT














The proof is obvious from the table in Corollary 1. Under the Utilitarian, the Welfarist and the
Boadway et al. objectives, we retrieve the result that the average social weight of the low-skilled
workers larger than one is a necessary condition for the EITC to be optimal. For the Roemer,
Egalitarian Equivalent and Conditional Egalitarian type 2 objective functions, this condition has
to be adjusted because the constraint that xH ≥ xL may be binding. If this constraint is binding,
an NIT can be optimal even when gX
L is larger than one. In that sense, these social objective
functions that ﬁnd their inspiration in equality of opportunity theories are more in favor of an
NIT. Intuitively, considering any equality of opportunity criterion amounts to modifying the social
weight gX












with X = R,V,EE,CE2, as can be seen from Table
4. The ICC eﬀect decreases the value of the average social weight on the low-skilled workers to
avoid a shift by high-skilled workers to low-skilled jobs. This explains why the government is less
willing to transfer income to low-skilled workers under equality of opportunity criteria.
The necessary condition to obtain unambiguous results under the Paternalistic Utilitarian crite-
rion is clearly more complicated: there is no simple relationship between the average social weight
18of the low-skilled workers being larger than onea n dt h eo p t i m a l i t yo fa nE I T C .T h eE I T C( N I T )
encourages (discourages) participation of the marginal worker, which results in an increased (de-
creased) utility of consumption equal to αP∗
L , which is desirable if this is larger (smaller) than











that appears on the right-hand side in Corollary 2 is used as a device to
correct undesirable social outcomes. It corrects individual labor supply to correspond to social
preferences. Hence, if social preferences are characterized by αP∗
L > (<)α,t h eg o v e r n m e n te n -
courages (discourages) participation, and the right-hand side of the inequality in the corollary is
positive, such that the EITC (NIT) then becomes more attractive for the Paternalistic Utilitar-
ian planner. This term is sometimes called the paternalistic or the ﬁrst-best motive for taxation
because it arises from diﬀerences between social and private preferences (Kanbur et al., 2006). As-
suming αP∗
L > α, when the Paternalist government’s views on working become more “Calvinistic”,
i.e., when α decreases, the term on the right-hand side becomes larger and hence works in favor of
an EITC to promote participation of more people.
As a ﬁnal point of reference, we compare our policy prescriptions with the policy prescription
of the Maximin social objective function. Maximin, which is a subcase of the Welfarist criterion,
works in favor of an NIT, as shown in Choné and Laroque (2005). Under Maximin, only the least
well-oﬀ receive a positive average social marginal utility of consumption. Because of the ICC, the
least well-oﬀ are the inactive; hence, the Maximin social objective coincides with the Conditional
Egalitarian type 1 such that an NIT is always optimal under Maximin.
Empirical studies suggest that participation decisions are more elastic at the bottom of the
skill distribution (see the empirical evidence surveyed by Immervoll et al., 2007, and Meghir and




Corollary 3 Under Assumption 1, for the Utilitarian, Welfarist and Boadway et al. criteria when
W (α) is a decreasing function and for the Roemer, EE, CE1 and CE2 criteria:16
(TL − Tu)/xL < (TH − Tu)/xH.
Appendix B states the proof. In our extensive model of labor supply, the degree to which labor
supply is distorted downwards depends on the diﬀerence between taxes paid when working and
taxes paid when inactive (the latter is −xu). The larger this diﬀerence, the more labor supply is
distorted downwards; if the diﬀerence is negative, labor supply is distorted upwards. We now have
the following corollary.
Corollary 4 Under Assumption 1, for the Utilitarian, Welfarist, and Boadway et al. criteria
when W (α) is a decreasing function and for the Roemer, EE, CE1 and CE2 criteria, the labor
supply of the high-skilled is more distorted downwards than the labor supply of the low-skilled.
Appendix B proves this result. The statement that the labor supply of the high-skilled is more
downwardly distorted also allows for the possibility that it is less upwardly distorted than the labor
supply of the low-skilled.











195.3 Restricted second best
This section searches for the optimal policies that satisfy fully at least one of the equality of
opportunity principles, in the second best. The following theorem, proved in Appendix D, shows
that there is only one possible allocation that satisﬁes ETES.
Theorem 2 Second-best optima satisfying ETES.
There exists only one second-best allocation satisfying ETES. In this allocation, xL = wL + xu
and xH = wH + xu. The corresponding values for xu,α∗
L and α∗
H are determined by:
xu [1 − 2[γF (α∗
L)+( 1− γ)F (α∗
H)]] = R,
α∗
L = v(wL + xu) − v (xu), α∗
H = v (wH + xu) − v(xu).
In the discussion following Lemma 1, we already noted the restrictive nature of ETES in
the context of our model. The severity of the ETES axiom also appears clearly in Theorem
2. Therefore, we think that in the second-best model, priority should be given to the EWEP
principle. We now show which allocations are second-best optimal under the diﬀerent criteria,
when the optimum is sought under the allocations satisfying EWEP. Of course, when the optimal
policies under the equality-of- opportunity-inspired social objective functions automatically satisfy
EWEP (i.e., when ν > 0), the optima derived in this section for X = R, EE and CE2 will be
identical to the optima in the previous subsection.
From Lemma 1 (a), we know that the critical values and the consumption levels for both types
o fw o r k e r sh a v et ob et h es a m e .W ed e n o t et h i sc r i t i c a lv a l u eb yα∗ and the workers’ consumption
by xw:
v(xw) − α∗ = v (xu). (18)
The only policy instruments of the planner are now xw and xu, which prevents any redistribution
between wL and wH-workers. Hence, the following programming problem describes the EWEP-
restricted general second-best problem.
ERGSBP (EWEP Restricted General Second-best Problem)
max
xw,xu,α∗
b SX (xw,x u,α∗),
subject to the government budget constraint:
[γwL +( 1− γ)wH − xw]F (α∗) − xu (1 − F (α∗)) − R =0 ,
and constraint (18).
We deﬁne the elasticity of participation (which is any of the previous elasticities where xL =
xH = xw is substituted), the average of the inverse of the private marginal utility of consumption,
the eﬀect of a uniform increase in private utilities on the social objective function and the average



























20The following theorem states the solution for the EWEP-restricted General Second-best Prob-
lem. Its proof is given in the supplementary material.
Theorem 3 Under asymmetric information, the optimal consumption levels have to satisfy the
budget constraint, constraint (18), and the following equations:













The interpretation of the equation for λ
−1 is similar to the interpretation in the previous section.
To obtain more speciﬁc expressions for the diﬀerent social objective functions, observe that b SX
α∗ =0
for all objective functions, except for the Paternalistic Utilitarian, for which b SX
α∗ =( α∗ − α)f (α∗).
It is then straightforward to derive the following corollary, which gives the optimal consumption
levels in the restricted second best.
Corollary 5 Under asymmetric information, the second-best optimal consumption levels satisfying
EWEP have to satisfy the budget constraint, constraint (18) and the expressions given in the
following table.
Table 6: Optimal tax formula satisfying EWEP under asymmetric information for















































































0 W (α)dF (α) and DEE =1 /v0 ¡
xwEE¢
.
Not surprisingly, the optimal tax formulas have the same shape as in the previous subsection,
but now the constraint xH = xL is imposed. The major diﬀerence is because EWEP impedes
the government in distinguishing between low- and high-skilled workers, such that the formula
now has to hold for an imaginary worker who has average productivity and thus average wage
γwL +( 1− γ)wH.
5.4 Priority principles
The social choice literature on equality of opportunity argues that because compensation and
responsibility cannot be fully satisﬁed in general, only a maximin variant makes sense (Fleurbaey,
212008). Therefore, rather than strictly imposing one of the equality of opportunity principles and
searching for the optimal allocation satisfying it, this section examines the optimal tax policies
when priority to the worst-oﬀ is given. The strict equality demanded by each of the principles is
weakened and replaced with maximin, and we search for social orderings that embody this weak
version of the principle.
EWEP requires that for each value of α, welfares are to be equalized. Rather than insisting on
full equality, the priority principle requires that social states be judged, for each α,b yt h ew e l f a r e
level obtained by the skill level L or H,t h a th a st h el o w e s tw e l f a r e .I te x p r e s s e st h ei d e at h a tt h e
allocation of consumption levels and jobs between two individuals with identical tastes should be
such that it is impossible to redistribute among them and increase the level of well-being of the
least well-oﬀ.
The question then becomes how to measure individuals’ welfare. A ﬁrst possibility is to measure
welfare by individual utilities. Roemer’s criterion applies a Utilitarian aggregation to these minimal
levels of welfare, but other aggregation procedures are possible, such as a Welfaristic and a Boadway




































where ΦR (α) > 0 weights diﬀerent tastes. These two objective functions are clearly distinct: SPWU
allows the planner to express inequality aversion (preference) with respect to utility diﬀerences that
arise because of diﬀerences in tastes if ΩR00 (·) < (>)0,w h i l ei nSPTU, the planner gives diﬀerent
weights to diﬀerent tastes as such, irrespective of their welfare levels. Both are generalizations of
Roemer’s criterion, but they do not respect the utilitarian reward principle (see Fleurbaey (2008)),
which requires zero aversion to inequalities due to diﬀerent preferences. However, if the planner
wants to express an opinion about welfare inequality that arises because of diﬀerences in tastes,
these speciﬁcations allow the planner to do so.
A second approach consists of taking an ordinal measure of welfare. We can ﬁnd here inspiration
with the reasoning that leads to the Egalitarian Equivalent ordering, and take the consumption
level that a person requires when he/she works that makes him/her indiﬀerent to his/her actual
consumption bundle. The aggregation of these welfare levels can occur again in a Welfarist or a
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dF (α), (22)
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dF (α), (23)
where ΦO (α) > 0 weights diﬀerent tastes. If the welfare function ΩO (·) becomes inﬁnitely inequal-
ity averse, the social welfare function (22) reduces to the egalitarian equivalent ordering (9).17
ETES requires that transfers be the same for all those who have equal skills. To apply the
priority principle here, for each level of skill, we have to consider the lowest transfer received by
an individual with that skill level. Because we have only two levels of skill, a social ordering
embodying the priority principle would be the following Priority Transfer ordering:






L (α) − wL,x u
L (α)}
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where ρ ∈ [0,1] gives the relative importance attached to the low-skilled agents.
The following lemma gives expressions for these new objective functions in the second-best
framework. The proof can be found in the supplementary material.













































e SPT = ρ(xL − wL)+( 1− ρ)(xH − wH).
The problem of ﬁnding the optimal tax rates with these objective functions has exactly the
same structure as the General Second-best Problem formulated in Section 5, whose solution is
17In a recent contribution, Hodler (2009) proposes to measure inequality in societies with unequal earning abilities
and tastes for work by computing traditional inequality indices (e.g., Gini, Atkinson-Kolm, Theil) for equivalent
wages in the entire population. When interested in inequality, one can do something similar here, but the priority
principle forces us to take, for each value of tastes, only the lowest equivalent wage into account.
23given by Theorem 1. Using the same procedure as in Section 5.2, it is easy to derive the terms of
the optimal tax formulas; hence, the following lemmata. The detailed proofs are available in the
supplementary material.
Lemma 5 The value of e SX
α∗
Y (Y = L,H):
e SX
α∗
Y =0for X = PWU, PTU, PWE, PTE and PT.
Lemma 6 The value of the Lagrangian multiplier:
ν ≥ 0 for X = PWU, PTU, PWE, PTE and PT.
Combining Lemma 6 with Lemma 1 (a), we see how the diﬀerent criteria perform from the
EWEP perspective: for PWU, PTU, PWE, PTE and PT, the constraint xH ≥ xL can be
binding, in which case xH = xL, α∗
H = α∗
L, and their solution satisﬁes EWEP.
Continuing further as in Section 5.2, it is straightforward to show that the optimal tax rates
have the same structure under the PWU, PTU, PWE, PTEand PT social objective functions in
the sense that the multiplier ν pushes the tax system away from the EITC. It is also easy to show
under Assumption 1 that for these social objective functions, (TL − Tu)/xL < (TH − Tu)/xH,
and the labor supply of the high-skilled is more distorted downwards than the labor supply of the
low-skilled.
6C o n c l u s i o n
This paper has studied optimal tax policies when agents diﬀer in terms of skills and tastes for
labor. We assumed quasilinear utility and that the labor supply decision is at the extensive margin.
The optimal tax policies under distinct objective functions were derived, in full and asymmetric
information.
The determination of appealing social criteria is important if one looks for social preferences
applicable in public economics, in particular when dealing with redistribution. When agents diﬀer
in terms of skills and tastes for labor, the equality of opportunity approach is inspiring (Fleurbaey,
1995a) and broadly accepted (Alesina and Angeletos, 2005).
This paper has shown that many criteria in the optimal tax literature (Utilitarianism, Wel-
farism, Boadway et al., Van de gaer and Paternalistic Utilitarian criteria) fail the requirements
of equality of opportunity; i.e., the compensation (EWEP) and responsibility (ETES) principles.
It has been shown that in the ﬁrst best, criteria respecting one of these principles are Roemer’s,
the Conditional Equality and the Egalitarian Equivalent criterion, the latter two advocated by
Fleurbaey (1995b). We also showed that in the second best, these criteria might satisfy EWEP,
while the standard criteria from the optimal tax literature never satisfy it.
Our simple optimal taxation exercise illustrates the discrepancy between standard Welfarist
approaches and methods proposed in the social choice literature. The standard Welfarist approach
equips agents with comparable indices of their well-being and applies an aggregation rule to these
indices. The equality of opportunity approach makes the distinction between personal characteris-
tics that are under and beyond individuals’ control and constructs (typically, axiomatically) criteria
that reach compensation and/or responsibility under full information. Although motivated by a
concern for equality of opportunity, Boadway et al. and Paternalistic Utilitarian criteria were not
24axiomatically derived, while the Van de gaer criterion was axiomatically derived from equalization
of opportunity sets. Therefore, not surprisingly, they never satisfy EWEP or ETES, even under
full information.
In this paper, we have explored two ways to deal with the equality of opportunity principles in
the second-best model. One is to search for optimal policies over the allocations that satisfy one
of the principles. The other is to weaken the full equality demanded in the equality of opportunity
principles and to replace them by priority principles, as advocated in social choice (Fleurbaey,
2008). We therefore build up new criteria, one satisfying an ETES-priority principle and several
others satisfying EWEP-priority principles leading to generalizations of Roemer’s criterion and the
egalitarian equivalent allocation. They have similar properties to the other equality of opportunity
principles but allow the researcher to express diﬀerent kinds and extents of inequality aversion.
Throughout, we ﬁnd that the equality of opportunity approach tends to work against an Earned
Income Tax Credit and in favor of a Negative Income Tax.
Appendix A: Proofs of Section 5.1.
P R O O FO FL E M M A1 ( a ) .
Suppose the proposition does not hold true. By (13), we then have that α∗
H > α∗
L. Hence,
there exist α, α∗
L < α < α∗
H for which high-skilled workers get utility v(xH) − α and low-skilled
workers get v(xu). Because the former depends on α but the latter does not, these two can never
be equal for all α, α∗
L < α < α∗
H, and so EWEP must be violated.
PROOF OF SOCIAL OBJECTIVE FUNCTIONS IN SECOND BEST.
Parts (a), (b), (c) and (d) are straightforward to prove.
To see part (e), observe that (11) (because of incentive constraints) implies that for all α,





{v(xL) − α,v(xu)}, oper
δH(α)




















{v(xH) − α,v(xu)}dF (α)
)
.
Because of the incentive constraints, this reduces to (24).
To see part (g), observe that, because the policy can no longer depend on α, (8) reduces to:
e SCE =m i n{v(xL) − e α,v(xu),v(xH) − e α}.
However, because (11) holds true, v(xL) − e α is always lower than v (xH) − e α; the low-skilled will
always be the worst-oﬀ and:
e SCE =m i n{v(xL) − e α,v(xu)}. (25)
25Consider maximization of v(xL) − e α subject to the relevant constraints. This amounts to maxi-
mization of v(xL), which determines the critical value α∗
L. Two possibilities need to be considered.
Either e α ≥ α∗
L, such that v(xL) − e α ≤ v(xL) − α∗
L = v(xu), and the policy just described is the
CE policy; or, e α < α∗
L,s u c ht h a tv(xL) − e α >v(xL) − α∗
L = v(xu),a n dt h eCE policy is found
by maximizing v(xu).T h eﬁrst case occurs for high values of e α, the second for low values.
To see part (h), note that the equivalent wages for the employed are equal to xY (Y = H or
L) and for the inactive v−1 (v(xu)+α). The objective is to maximize the lowest equivalent wage.
Consider the inactive. Because v−1 (.) is an increasing function, the equivalent wage is lowest for
those inactive having the lowest value for α, which are those with α = α∗
L. Hence the lowest value
for the equivalent wage is v−1 (v(xu)+α∗
L)=v−1 (v(xL)) = xL.
Appendix B: Proofs of Section 5.2.
P R O O FO FT H E O R E M1 .
The Lagrangian function for the general second-best problem is:
$(xL,x H,x u,α∗
L,α∗
H,λ,μL,μH,ν,c)=e SX + ν (xH − xL − c)
+λ{γ (wL − xL)F (α∗
L) − γxu (1 − F (α∗
L))
+(1− γ)(wH − xH)F (α∗
H) − (1 − γ)xu (1 − F (α∗
H)) − R}
+μL [v(xL) − α∗
L − v(xu)] + μH [v(xH) − α∗
H − v (xu)],
which has to be maximized with respect to xL,x H,x u, α∗
L, α∗
H and c, taking into account that
c ≥ 0. This leads to the following ﬁrst-order conditions:
e SX
xL − λγF (α∗
L) − ν = −μLv0(xL), (26)
e SX
xu − λ[γ(1 − F(α∗
L)) − (1 − γ)(1 − F(α∗
H))] = (μL + μH)v0(xu), (27)
e SX
xH − λ(1 − γ)F(α∗




L)(wL − xL + xu)=μL, (29)
e SX
α∗
H + λ(1 − γ)f (α∗
H)(wH − xH + xu)=μH, (30)
−ν ≤ 0 and νc =0 . (31)
Solving (26) for μL, equating the resulting expression to the left-hand side of (29) and using
deﬁnition (14), we can write:




















which is the ﬁrst equation of Theorem 1.
Similarly, solving (28) for μH, equating the resulting expression to the left-hand side of (30)
and using deﬁnition (15), we get the second equation of Theorem 1:

















λ(1 − γ)f (α∗
H)xH
.
26Divide Equations (26)—(28) by the marginal utility on their right-hand sides, adding the result-





































































Now, note that from (31), if ν > 0,t h e nc =0 ,s u c ht h a txH = xL and the last term in
the above equation always drops out. Using deﬁnitions (16) and (17) gives λgX
P = DX, and thus
λ
−1 = gX
P /DX, which is the third equation of Theorem 1.
P R O O FO FL E M M A3 .
Step 1: we prove the following lemma.














γ ,t h e nν =0 .
The proof relies on the necessary conditions that we just derived. Using the necessary condition
(30) in (28) and solving for ν, we obtain:
ν = −e SX
xH − e SX
α∗
Hv0 (xH)+λ(1 − γ)[F (α∗
H) − f (α∗
H)(wH − xH + xu)v0 (xH)].
Hence, ν > 0 (such that xH = xL = x and α∗
H = α∗
L = α∗)i fa n do n l yi f :
F (α∗) − (wH − x + xu)f (α∗)v0 (x) >
e SX





Similarly, using (29) in (26) and solving for ν,w eh a v e :
ν = e SX
xL + e SX
α∗
Lv0 (xL) − λγ [F (α∗
L) − f (α∗
L)(wL − xL + xu)v0 (xL)],
and we ﬁnd that ν > 0 if and only if:
F (α∗) − [wL − x + xu]f (α∗)v0 (x) <
e SX





If the antecedent of Lemma B holds true, the right-hand sides of (32) and (33) are equal, such
that ν > 0 requires:
F (α∗) − (wH − x + xu)f (α∗)v0 (x) >F(α∗) − [wL − x + xu]f (α∗)v0 (x),
but this can only hold true if wH <w L, which goes against the model’s assumptions.
Step 2: we compute the expressions that occur in Lemma B. They are given in the following
table.
27Table 7: Partial derivative of the social criteria w.r. to xY and α∗
















U v0 (x)F (α∗) 0
W v0 (x)
R α∗
0 Ψ0 (v(x) − α)dF (α) 0
B v0 (x)
R α∗
0 W (α)dF (α) 0
R = V v0 (x)F (α∗) 0 0
EE 1/γ 0 0
CE1 0 0
CE2 v0 (x) 0 0
P v0 (x)F (α∗) [α∗ − α]f (α∗)
Clearly, for X = U,W,B,P and CE1, by lemma B, ν =0 .
P R O O FO FC O R O L L A R Y3 .
Welfarist optimum.
Because xH >x L, v (xL) − α <v (xH) − α, and because Ψ00 < 0, Ψ0 (v(xL) − α1) >
Ψ0 (v(xH) − α1) > Ψ0 (v(xH) − α2) when α2 > α1, such that gW
H <g W
L . Combined with η(xL,α∗
L) ≥
η(xH,α∗
H), it follows from the expressions in Theorem 1 that (TL − Tu)/xL < (TH − Tu)/xH.



















































which holds as ≥ automatically if W (α) is a decreasing function, and as ≤ if W (α) is an increasing
function.
Therefore, assume that W (α) is a decreasing function; hence, gB
L >g B
H. Because xH >x L,
such that v0 (xH) <v 0 (xL), and the assumption that η(xL,α∗
L) ≥ η(xH,α∗
H), it follows from the
expressions in Theorem 1 that (TL − Tu)/xL < (TH − Tu)/xH.
Roemer, EE and CE2.
There are two cases to consider.





(ii) When ν > 0, xH = xL = x; hence, TY = wY −x (Y = L,H) and η(xL,α∗
L)=η(xL,α∗
H) (us-
ing (14)—(15)), which, combined with wH >w L, yields the inequality (TL − Tu)/xL < (TH − Tu)/xH
(where xH = xL).





xH . Therefore, under Assumption 1,
28from Corollary 4, we have that for the planners considered in the corollary, xH (wL − xL + xu) <
xL (wH − xH + xu).B e c a u s exH ≥ xL (from (11)), we have: wL − xL + xu <w H − xH + xu.
Appendix C: Analysis of the Modiﬁed Boadway et al. and Modiﬁed
Paternalistic criteria under asymmetric information.
Modiﬁed Boadway et al. criterion
Formally, under asymmetric information, the Modiﬁed Boadway el al. criterion is deﬁned by:















































































The extra term −[α∗







(Y = L,H) captures the social value of the diver-
gence between private and social preferences, just like under Paternalistic Utilitarianism.
Modiﬁed Paternalistic Utilitarian criterion
Formally, under asymmetric information, the Modiﬁed Paternalistic criterion equals:




























To ﬁnd the optimum, consider the solution to e SU. This solution determines values αU∗
L and αU∗
H .
If both of these values are smaller than α, then this solution coincides with the solution to e SMP.
Remember that αU∗
H > αU∗
L , such that for lower values of α, at some point α < αU∗
H . Hence, for


























To ﬁnd the optimal tax rates, one can use the formula from Theorem 1 to verify that a paternalistic











enters the optimal tax rate for the high-skilled. The
solution to the maximization problem also determines critical values for α∗
L and α∗
H. Decreasing
29the value for α further, α becomes smaller than the critical value for α∗
L, such that for low values






























To ﬁnd the optimal tax rates, once more one can use the formula from Theorem 1. It is then easy











enters the optimal tax
rate for skill level Y (Y = L,H).
Appendix D: Proof of Theorem 2 (Section 5.3)
Substituting the ETES constraints wL − xL = −xu and wH − xH = −xu into the government
budget constraint and rearranging gives the ﬁrst expression in the lemma. The second and third
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Abstract
In full information, Section 1 derives the optimal allocations under the Welfarist, Utilitarian, Boadway
et al., Roemer and Van de gaer criteria as well as the Full Equality of Opportunity (FEO), Conditional
Equality (CE) and Egalitarian Equivalent (EE) allocations. Section 2 proves footnote 15. Section 3 derives
the optimal EWEP-restricted general second best problem (Theorem 3). Section 4 gives the proofs behind
the optimal tax schedules under new normative criteria which satisfy priority versions of the compensation
and responsibility principles (Section 5.4).
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1. Welfarist, Utilitarian, Boadway et al., Roemer, Van de gaer, FEO,
CE and EE optimal allocations in ﬁrst best: Proofs
The Lagrangian functions for each of the social objective functions are formed by combining
the expressions for the social objective functions given in Section 3.2 and the government budget
constraint (1) with its associated Lagrangian multiplier λ. We drop the superscripts W, U, B,
P, R, V , FEO, CE and EE corresponding to the respective normative criterion for notational
simplicity.
Welfarist and Utilitarian planners
We discuss the Welfarist case ﬁrst, and show how the properties of the Utilitarian case fol-
low. The ﬁrst-order conditions of the constrained optimization problem with respect to the four
consumption functions are:
δL (α)[Ψ0(v(xw
L (α)) − α)v0(xw
L (α)) − λ]=0 ,
(1 − δL (α))[Ψ0(v(xu
L (α)))v0(xu
L (α)) − λ]=0 ,
δH (α)[Ψ0(v(xw
H (α)) − α)v0(xw
H (α)) − λ]=0 ,
(1 − δH (α))[Ψ0(v(xu
H (α)))v0(xu
H (α)) − λ]=0 .
Since δL (α) and δH (α) are equal to 1 or 0,f o re a c hv a l u eo fα,o n l yt w oo ft h e s eﬁrst-order
conditions matter; for those that matter the corresponding social marginal utilities of consumption
have to be equal, for the other two the consumption function does not matter (as nobody with
this value for α is receiving it). So we get for all those that do not work:
Ψ0(v(xu
L (α)))v0(xu
L (α)) = λ = Ψ0(v(xu
H (α)))v0(xu
H (α)) . (34)




For those that work, we get
Ψ0(v(xw
L (α)) − α)v0(xw
L (α)) = λ = Ψ0(v(xw
H (α)) − α)v0(xw
H (α)) . (35)
For a given value for α, the requirement is exactly the same for wL-a n dwH-workers. Hence,










L (α)) − α)v0(xw
L (α))
Ψ00(v(xw
L (α)) − α)[v0(xw
L (α))]
2 + Ψ0(v(xw
L (α)) − α)v00(xw
L (α))
> 0. (37)
Therefore, for α1 < α2, due to the concavity of v (.) we have:
v0(xw
L (α1)) >v 0(xw
L (α2)).
Combining the last inequality with (35) requires that Ψ0(v(xw
L (α1)) − α1) < Ψ0(v(xw
L (α2)) − α2).
Since Ψ is strictly concave, this requires that
v(xw
L (α1)) − α1 >v (xw
L (α2)) − α2,
and so low-skilled workers with a higher disutility of labor are not fully compensated for this higher
disutility. Due to (36), the same holds for high-skilled workers. Note that from (35) with α =0
and (34) we get that
xw
L (0) = xw
H (0) = xu.
The last equation and (36) imply that the optimal consumption varies with α and activity (em-
ployed or inactive), as summarized in Table 1.
The government budget constraint depends only on the number of high- and low-skilled that
work, not on which high- and low-skilled. From (37), workers’ consumption is increasing in their
disutility of work, and so it is cheapest and hence optimal for the government to make those work
with the lowest α. In view of (36), putting high-skilled and low-skilled at work is equally expensive
for the government, but since high-skilled contribute more to the budget than low-skilled, more




δL (α)=1for all α ≤ α∗




Therefore, the optimal activity assignment depends on α and on skill level (Y = L or H), as stated
in Table 1.
The Welfarist criterion reduces to the Utilitarian one when Ψ(y)
def
≡ y hence Ψ0(.)=1 .T h e r e -
fore, under the Utilitarian criterion, (34)-(35) yield that the ﬁrst-order conditions with respect to
consumption reduce to (∀α)( s i n c eλ is a constant):
v0(xwU
L (α)) = v0(xuU
L (α)) = v0(xwU
H (α)) = v0(xuU
H (α)) = λ




H (α) . (39)
2This is summarized in Table 1 when we state that optimal consumption is independent of α, skill
level and activity. Since all individuals get the same consumption bundle, it follows from the
reasoning leading to (38) that αU∗
L < αU∗
H , hence optimal activity depends on skill and α levels (as
stated in Table 1).
Boadway et al. planner





L (α)) − λ]dF(α)=0 ,
Z ∞
0
(1 − δL (α))[W (α)v0(xu




H (α)) − λ]dF(α)=0 ,
Z ∞
0
(1 − δH (α))[W (α)v0(xu
H (α)) − λ]dF (α)=0 .
Consequently, we get
v0(xw
L (α)) = v0(xu
L (α)) = v0(xw








H (α) . (40)
Given α, it is equally costly to have high- and low-skilled at work, but since high-skilled workers
contribute more to the government budget, the government always prefers to have more high-
than low-skilled at work. From (40), consumption depends on taste for leisure. Application of the










≥ (≤)0if W0 (.) ≥ (≤)0.
Using (40) in government budget constraint (1) yields that the function x(α) must be such
that Z ∞
0
x(α)dF (α)=γwLnL +( 1− γ)wHnH − R.
For the government budget constraint it only matters how many high- and low-skilled people
work, it does not matter which high- and low-skilled people work. Hence, diﬀerential treatment in
job assignment between equally skilled people must be based on the objective function. Using (4),







W (α)δL (α)αdF (α)−(1 − γ)
Z ∞
0
W (α)δH (α)αdF (α).
Whether people with high or low disutility of eﬀort should be working depends on the last two
terms of this expression. If W (α)a is increasing, having people with a high disutility working is





is larger than −1, then it is optimal for the government not to employ people that have a high
disutility of work. If this elasticity is smaller than −1, it will be optimal to employ people with a





W(α) > −1:δL (α)=1for all α ≤ α∗













W(α) < −1:δL (α)=1for all α ≥ α∗∗












0 δH (α)dF (α))
as the fraction of wL-agents (wH-agents) that are employed, the problem facing the planner with




W (α)v(x(α))dF (α) − γW (α)αnL − (1 − γ)W (α)αnH
+λ
·
γwLnL +( 1− γ)wHnH −
Z ∞
0
x(α)dF (α) − R
¸
,






W (α)v0 (x(α))dF (α),
∂$
∂nL
= −γW (α)α + λγwL,
∂$
∂nH
= −(1 − γ)W (α)α + λ(1 − γ)wH.
Note that the second and third condition cannot hold simultaneously with equality:
∂$
∂nL
≥ (≤)0⇔ [λwL − W (α)α] ≥ (≤)0,
∂$
∂nH
≥ (≤)0⇔ [λwH − W (α)α] ≥ (≤)0.
Hence, since wH >w L,w ea l w a y sh a v et h a t ∂$
∂nL ≥ 0 ⇒ ∂$
∂nH > 0 and ∂$
∂nH ≤ 0 ⇒ ∂$
∂nL < 0.W e





W(α) = −1 (i.e. W (α)α is constant):
Activity assignment
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨















B = W (α)α ⇒ nB
H =1 ,0 <n B
L < 1
wHλ
B >W(α)α >w Lλ
B ⇒ nB
H =1 ,n B
L =0 .
wHλ
B = W (α)α >w Lλ
B ⇒ 0 <n B
H < 1,n B
L =0 .





From Cases 1-3, we can conclude that the optimal activity depends on skill and α (see Table
1).
Paternalistic Utilitarian social planner
It is easy to see that we obtain the same ﬁrst-order conditions as with the Utilitarian objective,
and so the consumption functions are similar to (39): everybody receives the same level of con-
sumption x, which, because of the government budget constraint equals γwLnL+(1− γ)wHnH−R.
Consequently, using (5), the value of our Paternalistic Utilitarian objective function becomes
v(γwLnL +( 1− γ)wHnH) − γαnL − (1 − γ)αnH.
This expression only depends on the number of low- and high-skilled that are employed; the
planner determines nL and nH so as to maximize this expression. The derivatives of this expression
4with respect to nH and nL are, respectively
(1 − γ)[wHv0 (x) − α] and γ [wLv0 (x) − α].
Since wH >w L, we can distinguish the following cases:
Activity assignment:
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
λ = v0 (x)
wHλ >w Lλ > α ⇒ nH = nL =1 .
wHλ >w Lλ = α ⇒ nH =1 ,0 <n L < 1.
wHλ > α >w Lλ ⇒ nH =1 ,n L =0 .
wHλ = α >w Lλ ⇒ 0 <n H < 1,n L =0 .
α >w Hλ >w Lλ ⇒ nH = nL =0 .
Therefore, Table 1 states that the optimal activity assignment of each agent is based only on his
skill.
Roemer planner
There is no point in allowing the two elements in the min operator of Roemer’s objective
function to be diﬀerent in the ﬁrst best. Hence there are in principle four possibilities:
(i) δL (α)=δH (α)=1⇒ xw
L (α)=xw
H (α),
(ii) δL (α)=0 ,δH (α)=1⇒ v (xu
L (α)) = v(xw
H (α)) − α ⇒ xu
L (α) <x w
H (α),
(iii) δL (α)=δH (α)=0⇒ xu
L (α)=xu
H (α),
(iv) δL (α)=1 ,δH (α)=0⇒ v(xw
L (α)) − α = v (xu
H (α)) ⇒ xw
L (α) >x u
H (α).
There is equivalence between the maximin approach and the revenue-maximizing approach.
Maximizing tax revenue subject to a minimal utility level is equivalent to maximizing the minimum
of utility subject to the revenue constraint. Here, the objective function maximizes the sum of
the minimal utility levels but the logic is similar. The government maximizes tax revenue subject
to minimal utility levels. Tax revenue will be larger when more people are working, in particular
productive people. The minimal utility levels avoid that people with large α work. Therefore, if
anyone, we would like the ones with low values for α to work, and since the high-skilled have a
higher productivity, we want more highly skilled to work (α∗
H ≥ α∗
L); for α increasing, we move





L (α)) − α,v(xw















Maximizing this objective function implies
xw
L (α)=xw









H (α) ∀α ∈ [α∗
H,∞). (43)










L (α))dF (α). (44)





































Forming the Lagrangian with objective function (44), the previous government budget con-





L : v0 (xw
L (α)) = λ,
α∗
H < α : v0(xu
L (α)) = λ,
α∗
L < α ≤ α∗
H : v0(xu
L (α)) = λ
·

















L < α ≤ α∗
H, from (42), it follows that xu
L (α) <x w
H (α) and so v0 (xu
L (α)) >v 0 (xw
H (α)),s u c h
that v0(xu





H (α)) − α) < x.
To summarize, the optimal consumption and activity status depend on skill and α levels.
Van de gaer planner:
In the ﬁrst best, there is no reason for having diﬀerent values for opportunity sets of diﬀerent
skill-types. For the same reasons as usual, if anybody works, it will be those with a low disutility










L (α))dF (α). (45)
This objective function must be maximized subject to two constraints. The ﬁrst is that both





















H (α))dF (α). (46)


























6Forming the Lagrangian with objective function (45), the equality of opportunity set constraint
(46) with the associated Lagrangian multiplier μ and government budget constraint (47) with its







L (α))(1 + μ)=λγ, (48)
v0 (xu
L (α))(1 + μ)=λγ, (49)
−μv0 (xw
H (α)) = λ(1 − γ), (50)
−μv0 (xu
H (α)) = λ(1 − γ). (51)
From (48)-(49) and (50)-(51) respectively, we have:
xw
L (α)=xu
L (α)=x and xw
H (α)=xu
H (α)=x.
Hence, the optimal consumption bundles depend only on skill level. Substituting these two equa-












H,t h e nx = x. However, such a situation cannot be optimal, as high-skilled workers
contribute more to the government budget than low-skilled workers. Therefore, α∗
L < α∗
H (hence
the optimal activity status depends on α and on the level of skill) which yields x<x.
Lemma A: for an allocation that satisﬁes EWEP and ETES, there cannot exist an α ∈ R+ :
δL (α) 6= δH (α).
Proof. If such an α existed, we would have by EWEP that for this value either v(xu
L (α)) =
v(xw
H (α)) − α or v(xw
L (α)) − α = v(xu
H (α)), both of which are impossible since by ETES the
consumption bundles cannot depend on α.
FEO planner
In view of lemma A, we have that for all α : δL (α)=δH (α). Suppose there exists an allocation
satisfying EWEP and ETES in which some people work and others do not work. From ETES we
know that all low-skilled in work have to get the same consumption bundle, which with some abuse
of notation we denote as xw
L. Similarly, all high-skilled in work get the same consumption bundle,
denoted as xw
H. In addition, by ETES, we need (i) xw
L − wL = xu
L and (ii) xw
H − wH = xu
H.
EWEP requires that xu
L = xu
H. Combining this with (i) and (ii) we get that xw
L = wL −wH +xw
H,
which because EWEP requires xw
L = xw
H, reduces to wL = wH, which was excluded by assumption.
Hence an allocation that satisﬁes EWEP and ETES cannot have some people working and others
not working.
It is easy to verify that both axioms are satisﬁed by the following allocations:
(i) nH = nL =1and xw
L = xw
H = γwL +( 1− γ)wH − R.
(ii) nH = nL =0and xu = −R.
The consumption bundles follow from government budget constraint (1). The optimal FEO
policy is independent of individual characteristics.
7CE planner
A ﬁrst thing to note is that for the CE allocation to equalize u(xY (α),δY (α), e α) for all α
and Y = L,H requires that u(xY (α),δY (α), e α) is independent of wY . This has the following
implications:
i) for all α such that δL (α)=δH (α)=1⇒ xw
L (α)=xw
H (α). In addition, all those assigned in
a job have to get the same level of u(.,., e α), which implies that their consumption bundle cannot





ii) for all α such that δL (α)=δH (α)=0⇒ xu
L (α)=xu
H (α). In addition, all those that are
inactive have to get the same level of u(.,., e α), implying that their consumption bundle cannot
depend on α, such that xu
L (α)=xu
H (α)=xu;
iii) for all α such that δL (α)=1and δH (α)=0⇒ xw
L (α)=v−1 (v(xu
H (α)) + e α),w h i c h
combined with case (i) and (ii) gives xw
L = v−1 (v(xu)+e α);
iv) for all α such that δL (α)=0and δH (α)=1⇒ xw
H (α)=v−1 (v(xu
L (α)) + e α),w h i c h
combined with case 1 and 2 gives xw
H = v−1 (v(xu)+e α).
Combining these results, we get
xw
L = xw
H = v−1 (v(xu)+e α). (52)
Everybody gets the same level of utility v(xu) in the optimum, and so the problem of the ﬁrst
best allocation amounts to maximize the equal utility level v(xu) with respect to xu,n L and nH
subject to the budget constraint
R ≤ γ
¡
wL − v−1 (v(xu)+e α)
¢
nL − γxu [1 − nL]
+(1− γ)
¡
wH − v−1 (v(xu)+e α)
¢
nH − (1 − γ)xu [1 − nH].
The Lagrangian for this problem is
L = v (xu)+λ[γ
¡
wL − v−1 (v (xu)+e α)
¢
nL − γxu [1 − nL]
+(1− γ)
¡
wH − v−1 (v(xu)+e α)
¢
nH − (1 − γ)xu [1 − nH] − R].
Taking derivatives, we get :
∂L
∂xu = v0 (xu) − λγ
∂v−1(v(xu)+e α)
∂xu nL − λ(1 − γ)
∂v−1(v(xu)+e α)
∂xu nH




wL − v−1 (v(xu)+e α)
¤








∂nH = λ(1 − γ)
£
wH − v−1 (v(xu)+e α)
¤
+ λ(1 − γ)xu




wH − v−1 (v(xu)+e α)
¤¤
.
The two last ﬁrst-order derivatives cannot possibly both be equal to zero at the same time:
wH >w L ⇒ wH − v−1 (v(xu)+e α) >w L − v−1 (v (xu)+e α)
⇒ xu +
£




wL − v−1 (v(xu)+e α)
¤
.
H e n c ew ee i t h e rh a v et h a t
(i) ∂L
∂nL > 0 ⇒ ∂L
∂nH > 0, implying that nH =1=nL and from (1): xw
L = xw
H = γwL +
(1 − γ)wH − R,
(ii) −xu =
£
wL − v−1 (v(xu)+e α)
¤
= wL − xw
L from (52) and ∂L
∂nH > 0,i m p l y i n gnH =1and
nL (0 <n L < 1) follows from (1),
(iii) ∂L
∂nH > 0 and ∂L
∂nL < 0,i m p l y i n gt h a tnH =1and nL =0and from (1): xu =




wH − v−1 (v (xu)+e α)
¤
= wH − xw
H from (52) and ∂L
∂nL < 0,i m p l y i n gnL =0and
nH (0 <n H < 1)f o l l o w sf r o m( 1 )o r
(v) ∂L
∂nH < 0 ⇒ ∂L
∂nL < 0, implying that nH =0=nL and xu = −R from (1).
Which of these allocations yields the highest value for v(xu) depends on the parameters of the
model. If e α is suﬃciently low, the optimum will be case (i), as e α rises, we move from (i) to (ii),
as it increases further we move to (iii) and (iv) and for values of e α suﬃciently high, the optimum
will be case (v). Table 1 states that the optimal consumption depends on activity and the optimal
activity depends on skill, which summarizes these results.
EE planner
We want everybody to be indiﬀerent between his actual resources (consumption and activity)
and a reference resource bundle where he works and gets consumption e x.T h eb e s tt h i n gt od oi st o
give all employed exactly this reference consumption bundle: xw
L = xw
H = e x.C l e a r l y ,t ob r i n gt h e
equivalent wage of the inactive with a very high α down can lead to negative consumption levels.
To prevent this, we impose that xu
Y (α) ≥ 0. If this constraint is binding, these individuals get an
equivalent wage larger than e x; we have to give up the ideal of equalizing equivalent incomes. The
logical alternative then becomes Fleurbaey and Maniquet’s maximin solution.
To get an equivalent wage of exactly e x, a person with taste parameter α needs an inactivity
transfer equal to v−1 (v(e x) − α), which is independent of his skill level. Since we maximin the
e q u i v a l e n tw a g e s ,t h et r a n s f e rf o rt h ei n a c t i v ei sxu (α)=m i n
©
v−1 (v(e x) − α),0
ª
.T h e r e e x i s t s
av a l u ef o rα,s a yb α,s u c ht h a t ,i fα ≤ b α we have xu (α)=v−1 (v(e x) − α) ≥ 0,a n di fα > b α,
xu (α)=0 .I nb o t hc a s e s ,xu (α) ≤ e x such that it is cheaper to have people inactive than to have
them working.
However, working people produce wL or wH, while inactive people produce nothing. As
a consequence, it can never be optimal to have people inactive for which α ≤ b α:t h e y c o s t
v−1 (v(e x) − α) ≥ 0, but produce nothing. The best policy that maximizes SEE under budget
constraint is therefore xw
L = xw
H = γwL +(1− γ)wH −R, xu =0(hence the optimal consumption
depends only on activity) and α∗
L = α∗
H = v(γwL +( 1− γ)wH)−v(0) (hence the optimal activity
status depends only on α).
2. Footnote 15 and xX
H >x X
L for X = U,W,B,P and CE1: Proofs (Section
5.2)
Step 1: we proof the following lemma:
Lemma C: xX
H >x X
L for X = U,W,B,P and CE1.
Proof. Under X = U,W,B,P and CE1, ν =0from Lemma 3. Assume xH = xL = x hence
α∗
H = α∗










L + λγf(α∗)(wL − x + xu)
i
.














xL/γ = e SX
xH/(1 − γ), e SX
α∗
L/γ = e SX
α∗
H/(1 − γ) for X = U,W,B,P and CE1 from Table
7 in Appendix B, the two previous equations yield λf(α∗)(wL − x + xu)=λf(α∗)(wH − x + xu)
but this can only hold true if wH = wL, which leads to a contradiction. We can conclude that
xH >x L.
From Lemma C, (10) and (12) we have α∗
H > α∗
L under the U,W,B,P and CE1 criteria.
Step 2: in second best, α∗
H, α∗
L < ∞.
Proof. As ∀α : f(α) > 0, all low-ability (high-ability) people work means α∗
L →∞(α∗
H →∞ )a t





L > 0 when ν =0 .
Proof. Suppose α∗
L =0 . From (10), evaluated at α∗
L =0 ,w eh a v exL = xu.S i n c e ν =0and
F (0) = 0,f r o mﬁrst-order condition (26), μL = −e SX
xL/v0 (xu).T h e v a l u e α∗
L =0can only be
optimal if ∂$/∂α∗
L|α∗
L=0 ≤ 0, which requires, using the previous results
λγf(0)wL ≤−e SX
α∗
L − e SX
xL/v0 (xu),
Going back to Table 7 in Appendix B, it is clear that for all the criteria the right-hand side is
not positive, such that α∗
L =0can only be optimal if wL ≤ 0, which, however, was excluded by
assumption.
Step 4: to complete the proof, note that we have shown that, for the U, W, B, P and CE1
criterion, ν =0 , xH >x L and thus α∗
H > α∗
L.F o r X = R, EE and CE2,w eh a v es h o w nt h a t
ν ≥ 0,s u c ht h a tα∗
H ≥ α∗
L.
3. Proof of Theorem 3 (Section 5.3)
The Lagrangian is
$(xw,x u,α∗,λ,μ)=b SX
+λ{[γwL +( 1− γ)wH − xw]F (α∗) − xu (1 − F (α∗)) − R}
+μ[v(xw) − α∗ − v (xu)].
The ﬁrst-order conditions are
b SX
xw − λF (α∗)=−μv0 (xw), (53)
b SX
xu − λ(1 − F (α∗)) = μv0 (xu), (54)
b SX
α∗ + λ[γwL +( 1− γ)wH − xw + xu]f (α∗)=μ. (55)
Combining (53) and (55) and using (19) yields

































from which, using Deﬁnitions (20) and (21), we get λgX = DX,a n ds oλ
−1 = gX/DX.
104. Proofs of Section 5.4
Proof of lemma 4
(a) Proof for e SPWU, e SPTU, e SPWE and e SPTU.
Observe that in the second best, for α < α∗
L ≤ α∗
H, δL (α)=δH (α)=1 , xw
L (α)=xL,
xw
H (α)=xH and that xL ≤ xH.F o r α∗
L ≤ α ≤ α∗
H, δL (α)=0 ,a n dδH (α)=1and by
(12), v(xu)=v(xH) − α∗
H,w h i c hf o rα∗
L ≤ α ≤ α∗
H gives v(xu) ≤ v(xH) − α.F o r α > α∗
H,
δL (α)=δH (α)=0 ,a n dxu
L (α)=xu
H (α)=xu.
Substituting these properties into SPWU and SPTU yields e SPWU and e SPTU, respectively.
Substituting these properties into SPWE and SPTE leads to e SPWE and e SPTE. In the procedure,
for α∗
L ≤ α ≤ α∗
H we use v−1 (v(xu)+α) ≤ xH from v (xu) ≤ v(xH) − α.
(b) Proof for e SPT.
Since consumption levels do not depend on α in the second best, SPT reduces to
ρmin{xL − wL,x u} +( 1− ρ)min{xH − wH,x u}.
Hence, with the ETES priority principle, the Lagrangian is
$(xL,x H,x u,α∗
L,α∗
H,λ,μL,μH,ν)=ρmin{xL − wL,x u} +( 1− ρ)min{xH − wH,x u}
+λ{γF(α∗
L)(wL − xL)+( 1− γ)F(α∗
H)(wH − xH)
−[γ (1 − F(α∗
L)) + (1 − γ)(1− F(α∗
H))]xu − R}
+μH [v(xH) − α∗
H − v(xu)] + μL [v(xL) − α∗
L − v(xu)] + ν (xH − xL − c)
with 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1.
(i) Suppose xL−wL ≥ xu.T h eﬁrst-order condition of the Lagrangian with respect to xL then
becomes −λγF (α∗
L) − ν = −μLv0 (xL),f r o mw h i c hμL > 0.H o w e v e r , t h e ﬁrst-order condition
with respect to α∗
L gives μL = λγf (α∗
L)(wL − xL + xu) ≤ 0 under the assumption made. Hence
we obtain a contradiction, such that we know that xL − wL <x u.
(ii) Suppose xH − wH ≥ xu.T h e nw eg e t−TH ≥ xu; the high-skilled workers receive a larger
subsidy than the inactive people which cannot be optimal. Consequently, xH − wH <x u.
As a result of (i) and (ii), the ETES priority principle reduces to ρ(xL − wL)+(1 − ρ)(xH − wH).
Proof of Lemma 5
That for all objective functions e SX
α∗
H =0and that e SPT
α∗
H = e SPT
α∗
L =0is evident. Simple diﬀeren-




ΩR (v(xL) − α∗
L) − ΩR (v(xu))
¤
. Due to (10), v(xL) − α∗
L = v(xu),a n d
so e SPWU
α∗
L =0 . Similarly it can be shown that e SX
α∗
L =0for X = PTU, PWE and PTE.
Proof of Lemma 6
The proof follows the reasoning for Lemma 3 (using Lemma 5) so is skipped here.
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